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1. Introduction
A Grid defines a particular type of technological and organizational interaction
within a computational network, describing supply and demand for computa-
tional or data services[1]. However, Service providers usually have more informa-
tion about quality or availability of the services they provide, than their potential
users (consumers). This case of asymmetrically distributed information usually
leads to suboptimal results due to occurring uncertainty on the consumer side,
and thus to a inferior usage of the Grid in total. Not only providers, but also
consumers, can cause asymmetrically distributed information. Both transaction
participants have to deal with uncertainty caused by environmental factors (e.g.
network failures as a result of natural disasters). According to our comprehen-
sion of a Grid, there is no difference between a Grid market and other imperfect
markets like a second-hand car market. Effects which can be observed in physical
markets can be found in Grid environments as well. Managing the asymmetrical
distributed information depends on the organizational form of the Grid. Enterprise
Grids, used by local participants in the same organization, can be controlled by
company policies. Larger Grid systems, which form e.g. virtual organizations with
many service demands and offers in parallel, are more difficult to control. As long
as incentives for strategic behaviour exist (e.g. by introducing payment for on-
demand service usage), asymmetrically distributed information can be exploited
by strategically acting participants. Without regulating and coordinating mecha-
nisms the Grid may suffer from low quality of service (QoS) due to asymmetrically
distributed information.
Because of these economic issues, policies have to be defined to overcome these
shortcomings. As these policies are not enforceable in all Grid physiologies, we
propose to use trust and reputation concepts, similar to those used in e-commerce
applications. However, our understanding of trust extends the prevalent technical-
oriented views in Grid environments. Secure communication and digital certificates
are necessary, but not sufficient to generate trust both in the system and to other
participants.
The paper investigates in economic theory driven approaches in order to
reduce uncertainty in automated micro decisions like a single service selection.
Three different forms of relations between Grid Service providers and customers
make it necessary to differentiate mechanisms reducing asymmetric distributed
information. Therefore we develop a framework to depict the importance of trust
and reputation concepts to reduce this uncertainty in different grid environments.
This framework should help to define the policies keeping a grid system running
in dependence of the corresponding environment.
We begin our discussion by introducing three spheres for describing Grid sys-
tems (see figure 1): the technological infrastructure, the business infrastructure and
the policies infrastructure [2]. That implies a holistic approach which is necessary
to understand the economic implications.
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1. The computing technology infrastructure describes the underlying technolog-
ical progress, comprising hardware and software as well as the engineering
process.
2. The business sphere is the starting point for the development of new services
and products. Having the technology in place is a basic prerequisite, but does
not generate innovation by itself. In the business sphere, existing technology
enables innovative business models, using corresponding economic logic.
3. Businesses, however, need rules, for protecting participants’ rights and prop-
erties. The policies infrastructure describes possibilities and measures in order
to dispose of uncertainty and fraud. This requires a joint understanding and
acceptance of rules, norms and laws, as well as agreed-on measures to regulate
and enforce compliance.
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Figure 1. Infrastructure Spheres
The spheres may not be considered independently of each other. Without
technology, there are no services and products to be invented. Without business
models, no policies are needed to regulate their actions.
If understood as a positive feedback loop, the relation becomes even clearer:
the availability of new technology (Overlay networks, SOA) allows the develop-
ment of new innovative business models (on-demand or utility computing, the
Grid). New business models lead to the existence of new software-based services
and products. In the next step, normative institutions like norms, policies and
contracts need to be applied to protect markets, providers and consumers from
fraud and wrongdoers. A world without contracts or rules leads to uncertainty
and prevents entities from making rational decisions (e.g. early P2P networks [3]).
A world in which people interact needs human-readable rules; an environment of
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artificial agents requires machine interpretable rules. This again leads to technolog-
ical development. Considering technological inventions as a present, constant flow
of innovating ideas and concepts of computer scientists, the research challenges for
management will mainly lie in the business and the policies infrastructure [4].
Dividing our research field into infrastructure spheres allows us to abstract
from technology and business models, and to focus on policy details. This abstrac-
tion allows us to define necessary policy rules for each Grid coordination form.
The article is organized as follows: section 2 describes the related work in the
domains of Grid economics and reputation-based trust. In section 3 we will estab-
lish the connection between reputation, coordination forms and the infrastructure
spheres, which then leads to our final framework. Section 4 presents three stages
of Grid Systems, distinguishable along the dimensions of the framework, and with
examples to illustrate the practical application. The conclusion is presented in
section 5.
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2. Related Work
Our approach focuses on Grid coordination forms and the necessary reputation
concepts. Our proceeding is top-down, from the economic models to the infras-
tructure requirements. The technical view on Grid Systems is only a small part
of our framework. Related work can thus be found in the domains of taxonomies
for Grid economies, reputation-based Grid resource allocation, and is based on the
classification of reputation in institutional economics. The combination of these
domains leads to a recent field of research, Grid Economics (see figure 2).
Taxonomy
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e. g. computational Grids, 
data Grids, service Grids or 
degree of distribution
e. g. principal agent theory, 
coordination forms, transac-
tion costs
Policies in
Grid
Environments
e. g. Policy-based scheduling, 
Policy as Security Mechanism, 
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Mechanisms
in Grids
e. g. GridEigenTrust,
P2P reputation management, 
reputation based scheduling
Integrated Approach
economically motivated approaches (e. g. meeting the problem of asymmetrically distributed information in Grid environments with reputation)
Figure 2. Classification of related work
The taxonomies for Grid economies focus on the technical properties of Grid
Systems. Krauter et al. [5] identify architectural properties to survey different
Grid approaches. They differentiate between Computational Grids, Data Grids and
Service Grids. The computational Grids have a higher computational capacity as
every single machine on its own, whereas the Data Grids are focused on providing
an infrastructure to manage data from data repositories. The third category is
represented through the Service Grids. They are built for services that can not be
provided by single machines. Another taxonomy for dynamic resource allocation in
Grid Systems is presented in [6]. He analyses dynamic task scheduling solutions.
A further taxonomy for resource scheduling in Grid economies can be found in
[7]. In contrast to these approaches, the taxonomy of Buyya et al.[8] focuses more
on economic aspects. Buyya’s paper does not include reputation aspects, but it
proposes economic models to allocate resources in a more efficient way and provides
pricing strategies for service providers.
The understanding of Policies in Grid Systems cover a wide range of defini-
tions. Policies are increasingly used for automated system management [9] and to
control the behaviour of complex systems. Policies can be changed to adapt the
system’s behaviour without modifying any source code. To define such system-wide
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policies the understanding of each participant has to match. Therefore, different
languages have been introduced (see e.g. [10] for an comparison of three different
languages). Policies can also be used to define service and resource selection strate-
gies in Grid Systems [11]. In a different understanding, policies can be seen as a
kind of security mechanism (e.g. [12]). Our understanding of policies is a superset
of all kind of rules, languages, mechanisms all participants have to follow. As you
can see in the following sections, not all types of Grid environments allow the en-
forcement of these policies. If an environment does not allow enforcing rules, other
mechanisms have to be found. Therefore, we propose repuatation mechanisms to
ensure that.
Institutional economic theories investigate the exchange of scarce goods be-
tween economic subjects. Thereby the way of exchange, the coordination of the
economic subjects, is of great importance. The transaction cost concept [13] was
enhanced by Williamson [14], who compiled a pattern of determining attributes
for the transaction costs’ amount, see [14, p. 40]. The economical concept of trans-
action costs can be divided into two parts [15]: motivation costs and coordination
costs. Motivation costs describe the agents’ motivation to align their interests, e.
g. the costs of cheating or opportunistic behavior [14] or the agency costs among
owners, managers, and debt holders [16]. Coordination costs are the charges of
exchanging products or services as well as the indirect production expenses. There
are three different types of efforts to coordinate the actions between specialized
agents: obtaining information, cost coordination and costs of measurement. Stigler
identified costs of obtaining information [17]. Costs of coordinating input in pro-
duction have been identified by Alchian and Demsetz [18] and Barzel noted costs
of measurement [19].
Also being ingrained in Multi-Agent research, there is already some work
considering trust and reputation-based approaches in Grid Computing. The dif-
ferentiation of trust can be found in [20]. The authors distinguish between two
steps of trust: verifying the identity of an entity and what that identity is autho-
rized to do and as a second step the monitoring of entities’ behavior. Like the
authors, in this paper we concentrate on the behavioral trust which is amended
through reputation information. In [21] the authors present a comparison of differ-
ent trust mechanisms and their applicability for task scheduling in Grid Systems.
Alunkal et al. [22] present their GridEigenTrust framework to manage trust and
reputation in a Grid System. Therefore they extend a common P2P reputation
management mechanism, called EigenTrust. In contrast to the work of Alunkal
et al., our framework focuses on the necessarity of reputation regarding the Grid
characteristic.
Illustrated in figure 2, our aim is to integrate these research areas and gen-
erating an integrated approach. This economically motivated approach meets the
problem of asymmetrically distributed information in Grid environments with help
of reputation where necessary. The idea of using markets to allocate resources and
services in Grid environments is proposed by different researchers like [23] and [24].
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Demonstrated by the work of Schnizler [25, p. 31 et seqq.], markets provide incen-
tives to express true values for service requests and offers. This leads to efficient
resource allocation. Schnizler differs between static (fixed prices) and dynamic
price models. The latter one considers the dynamic availability of resources in a
Grid. Our work intends to demonstrate under which conditions a certain form of
resource allocation makes sense and what kind of policies have to be defined.
There are several projects with the intention to integrate these research areas.
The project GridTrust1 focuses on a secure technical infrastructure for Grid Sys-
tems. The project also addresses the integration of reputation-based concepts to
enhance users’ confidence. Another related project is CONOISE-G 2. This project
regards the term ”virtual organization” as a special form of an open system [26].
In our understanding a virtual organization is a hybrid coordination form (having
characteristics of both markets and hierarchies), using a contractual framework
between participants. Consequently, our understanding of trust and reputation
differs in some aspects.
A truly open Grid market environment, where resources and services can be
traded freely, is envisioned in the SORMA project3. SORMA intends to establish
an open Grid platform where multiple providers and consumers are able to trade
Grid resources and services. The eRep project4 intends to develop a reputation-
based mechanism for e-commerce and Grid commerce environments. Both projects
are currently running with the authors’ participation.
1http://www.gridtrust.eu
2http://www.conoise.org/
3http://www.sorma-project.org
4http://megatron.iiia.csic.es/eRep/
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3. Framework
This subsection considers the economic motivation of confidence-building activities
in Grid economies. The classification to illustrate the problem of uncertainty in eco-
nomics [17] is based on findings of agency problems in economics. These problems
base on the fact that information in economies is usually distributed asymmetri-
cally. However, environmental factors can also lead to uncertainty, which means
that only a part of the technological infrastructure used by the participants in a
Grid economy is under their influence.
Asymmetric distribution of information appears, if a market participant has
more information through its position than another participant. For example, a
service provider has more information regarding the provided service than a po-
tential service consumer. Thus, the consumer has to overcome this uncertainty
before the agreement is signed. However, the uncertainty regarding the technical
infrastructure concerns both, consumer and provider. In the following we focus on
asymmetric distributed information between grid participants.
Akerlof [27] describes in his article about a market for ”lemons” the problem
of uncertainty regarding the quality of second-hand cars. Akerlof’s findings can be
applied for Grid economies, where the resources represent heterogeneous goods.
To reduce the uncertainty, institutional economics provides different concepts to
reduce the costs of uncertainty for participants. They focus on the analysis of
incomplete and asymmetrically distributed information. This asymmetry leads
to imperfect markets as a consequence of uncertainty. As an effect of imperfect
markets agents are impeded to act rational.
We differentiate between hidden characteristics and hidden action to explain
the problems occurring in Grid economies. The third causation, which is mentioned
in literature, the hidden intention, is excluded in further reflections due to its
missing relevance in Grid economies. All uncertainty types refer to market failure.
Through hidden characteristics, the fact that not both parties know all rele-
vant attributes, the problem of ”adverse selection” [27] arises. There is uncertainty
regarding to the effort’s quality. The effects of these problems can be limited
through some activities. Such an activity is the so called signaling, the active for-
warding of information. The market participant, who is better informed, publishes
this missing information with e.g. exogenous cost signals or contingent contracts.
Another approach to overcome this asymmetric information distribution is screen-
ing. The less informed participant undertakes endeavors to retrieve the required
information about its partner.
Besides standardization of services and products, the provision of different
and differentiated contracts is another possibility to diminish the problem of ad-
verse selection. The service provider can choose one contract with a certain quality
level. Based on this choice, the service consumer can draw conclusions about the
reliability of the provider.
Hidden action (also an uncertain behavior of agents) follows the so called
effect of moral hazard. In contrast to adverse selection, the provider’s behavior or
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quality of the service is not even observable after the transaction occurred. Moral
hazard means that the principal and the agent have the same relevant information
before and after signing the contract. But after a decision, which is relevant for
the output, the agent has more information about its activity and the outcome of
this action. In particular the principal can not assess whether the observed results
originate in agents efforts or environmental influence. To solve this problem, the
agent has to be part in the outcome of its activities. In our Grid-related case it is
conceivable that an agent can profit from its rising reputation (e.g. after fulfilling
a job).
Confidence-building measures are helpful for reducing risk within transac-
tions between Grid participants. As mentioned above, there is a relationship be-
tween confidence-building measures and Grid coordination forms. Presuming an
understanding of the structure of transaction costs the amount of those costs deter-
mine which coordination form is most efficient. As Williamson has shown, specific
contracts define and provide rules for each form of coordination [28] and [29].
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Figure 3. Forms of Grid Coordination
Beside the transaction costs the specificity of goods to be traded is of great
interest for the selection of the appropriate coordination form. The degree of speci-
ficity is measured by comparing the economic value to the value of the next best
10 Ko¨nig, Matros and Eymann
alternative good. The higher the difference, the more specific is the product or
service. The project CATNETS5, funded by the European Union (EU) and coor-
dinated at our department, provides a Grid-related example for different specific
services. There are basic services (corresponding to lowly specific products) and
complex services (corresponding to highly specific products) within the catallaxy-
based Grid market (see e.g. [30]).
The possible types of coordination range from both extremes, open Grid to
Intragrid with the Intergrid in between6, see also figure 3.
3.1. Intragrid
The term Intragrid describes the connection of several computers or clusters within
an organization. Participant is, in this case, only one company that wants to
increase its extent of in-house resource utilisation. The distribution is delimited
on one place, namely the location of the organisation, or at a more technical view,
its local area network.
Hierarchies are marked by asymmetrical and long-term connections between
entrepreneur and employees. From an outside view the hierarchy appears as a uni-
form institution. The hierarchy usually solves the economizing problems by means
of rules instead of prices and by controlling through an administrative structure.
However, the usage of enterprise internal prices (without reference to the market),
mainly for billing and accounting reasons, is not excluded. Current Grid Implemen-
tation are structured hierarchical, which we call Intragrid. Intragrids are subject to
institution wide regulations. The control intensity within this coordination form is
high. The situation of asymmetric information distribution does not appear when
strong controlling instances are existing. In the following we abstract from tragedy
of the commons problem [31] in hierarchy scenarios. Two concurrent departments
of a single company that compete for company bonus payments are institutionally
embedded as long as they do not have access to markets.
The incentive intensity within an Intragrid is low due to employment con-
tracts. Existing agreements are fulfilled. However, an outperformance of quality
of service attributes is not expected due to the contract structure. Unlike clas-
sical employment contracts, we do not consider owner employment relationships.
There are only service or resource provider and consumer to be analyzed within
an Intragrid. Both are bound to the strict hierarchy frame of rules.
3.2. Intergrid
An Intergrid is a pool consisting of several Intragrids with help of a framework
agreement. The most significant attribute in contrast to an Intragrid is the allo-
cation across organizational boundaries.
There are varied options for a creation of coordination forms between hi-
erarchies and markets. The appropriate hybrid form can be chosen individually.
5http://www.iw.uni-karlsruhe.de/catnets/
6The original terms of coordination forms by Williamson are hierarchy, hybrid and market which
are used in the following for explaining the theoretical derivations of our approach
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This situation is characterized by a bilateral dependence between contractual part-
ners. The economic term is called neo-classical contract. In the Grid context, the
union of several Intragrids leads to a hybrid coordination form, we call Intergrid.
Distinct from hierarchies, an Intergrid constitutes a collaboration between legally
independent institutions. The inter-institutional agreement includes a higher in-
centive intensity, but a lower control intensity than the hierarchy type. According
to the lower control intensity the Intergrid needs reputation-based mechanisms for
compensating the inherent risk. Usually, framework agreements are made where
the price and the valid contract period are fixed.
3.3. Open Grid
Market relations appear in a symmetrical and short-term nature. The market op-
erates with decentralized, price-oriented mechanisms, in which the large number of
buyers and sellers limit the scope for opportunistic action. The form of contracts
used in this form of coordination are called classical contracts. The very low con-
trol intensity in comparison with hierarchy and hybrid form requires even better
trust and reputation-based mechanisms. Our approach is taking advantage of the
high incentive intensity of the market structure to reduce asymmetric distributed
information and the associated risk.
The vision of a complete virtualisation of information and communication in-
frastructure by the provision of resources like cpu cycles, data storage or memory
capacity over Grid infrastructures allows the development of an open Grid mar-
ket. In this case, resources are supplied and consumed both within one company or
research institution as well as across organizational borders. In an open Grid the
number of participants can not be determined. The distribution is characterised
by full transparency with regard to the participants. While the technological in-
frastructure was given great attention in recent research during the last years, the
spheres of business and rules are widely uninvestigated. Open Grid markets offer
the greatest opportunity in order to analyze economical logic and rules because
they are nearest to a physical world market structure. Open Grid markets are yet
not fully implemented. The project SORMA, funded by the EU, takes up this issue.
SORMA deals with an technological implementation as well as potential business
models and rules. Another EU-funded project, called eRep, focuses on describing
and evaluating rules in open Grid markets. Both projects have just been started.
This subsection has shown the connection of transaction costs and organiza-
tion forms as well as asymmetric distributed information and reputation. Changes
in the coordination form of Grid Computing determine, ceteris paribus changes
in the policy infrastructure. Also the reputation-based mechanisms to be support
this change. This section elaborates the differences within the Grid coordination
forms mentioned. The infrastructure spheres connected with our Grid Classifica-
tion Framework offers good analysis possibilities. Only by the usage of the frame-
work it becomes clear that infrastructure spheres must be considered under com-
pletely different views. Thus, the structure of the following section is subdivided
by the Classification Framework with its particular infrastructure spheres.
12 Ko¨nig, Matros and Eymann
4. Implementation in different Grid Coordination Forms
This section implements the usage of the theoretical framework of the previous sec-
tion. To keep analogy to that section, the section is subdiveded also into Intragrid,
Intergrid and open Grid. Each subsection follows the partition of the infrastructure
spheres, i.e. Business, Policies and Technology.
4.1. Intragrid
4.1.1. Business. The deployment of small scale grids, in particular Intragrids as
described in section 3 can help enterprises to minimize capital expenses through the
aggregation of servers, storage, memory and cpu capacity. In addition, Intragrids
can also provide an option for on-demand access to resources’ needs as necessitated
in the scope of particular demands (e.g. problem solving or seasonal capacity
requirements). In the following we illustrate an Intragrid business case related to
practice.
Many enterprises’ computing centres are organized as cost or profit centers
[32]. A cost center is strictly integrated in the firm’s form of organization. An infor-
mation systems cost center within an enterprise has no organizational differences
to accounting or human resources departments. Services are provided to support
internal processes. In most cases the coordination of information systems is ensured
over a predetermined budget (traditional cost center). If necessary there is back
charging for internal cost allocation (advanced cost center or profit center model).
Pricing and accounting plays an inferior role in this scenario. The customer (in
this case, the enterprise) demands a determined quality of service. The provider
(the cost center) must meet this demand with the required quality of service level.
Otherwise the enterprise will think about a budget adjustment or a personnel
replacement within the department. The Intragrid scenario depicts a situation of
maximum control and maximum chance enforcing claims due to unsatisfied service
customers inside the enterprise. This gain of control and flexibility comes along
with drawbacks to in-house expertise, scalability, innovation, coordination costs,
etc.
4.1.2. Policies. The principal-agent relationship, determines the existence of dif-
ferent institutions [33]. In this section, only one of the possible institutions, namely
the hierarchy unit, is considered. Within the hierarchy unit an agreement about
the policies has to be established. This agreement can be an explicit or an implicit
one.
In an Intragrid, whose range is limited to a hierarchy unit, the body of rules
and regulations can be defined in a certain way (see e.g. [34, p. 182]), so that no
principal-agent problem occurs. For the Grid Systems, this leads to fixed prices for
resources like cpu or disk space (internal prices). Following, no principal-agent con-
flict can be found within the Intragrid, if the policies are implemented adequately.
Figure 4 illustrates this simple relationship. The consumer pays a fixed price
pintra to receive a service s. For the consumer there is no kind of risk to be observed.
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Figure 4. Relationship between service provider and consumer
in an Intragrid
For the participants there is also no incentive for opportunistic activity, as there
are fixed prices and the highest available quality of service level.
4.1.3. Technology. The technology of Intragrids is an unproblematic field. The
network is only a local one, so that the availability of services and resources can
be ensured. Possible failures of the network and other infrastructural components
can be limited. Furthermore the problem of moral hazard, such an agent having
problems to detect the origin of a failure, the defective service or the missing
environment, can be solved. Moreover, external factors can be neglected, because
of the purely internal nature of all transactions.
The implemented Grid system works by aggregating all available computa-
tional resources into a virtual resource pool. Resources that might remain idle are
matched to the requirements of the job. Thus, large jobs can be spread out over all
the systems on the Intragrid for increasing utilization. This rule-based mechanism
within the software follows a strict institutional frame.
4.2. Intergrid
4.2.1. Business. The area of commercial Intergrid solutions is sparsely populated.
Consider a scenario where, unlike the Intragrid scenario, an internal information
system provider is not able or willing to meet the service level agreements. The en-
terprise is forced to react. In the Intragrid case mentioned above, the management
could replace human resources or adjust the annual budget in hope of reaching the
desired quality standards. However, it is also possible to get the required services
from external suppliers. In this situation of the outsourcing process the enterprise
will make a pre-selection of possible suppliers. The main problem in this situation
is how to choose the best service provider and what the criteria are that matter.
Intermediate results of an explanatory case study we are still carrying out show
that there is a lack of applicable mechanisms, which could help in this situation.
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The case study results also exhibit that small and medium sizes enterprises man-
aged such situations with common sense. Thereby they use unconsciously trust- or
reputation based approaches, for instance with aid of experiences made in the past
or survey of customers who know these providers. These pragmatic approaches,
which reflect the pragmatic business routines, comprise experiences made in the
past. And as distinguished from practice our theoretical thoughts are adaptable to
support both macro decisions (for instance the selection of a provider) and micro
decisions (for instance the selection of atomistic services invocations within a dis-
tributed system). Assuming the enterprise chose a provider which has to deliver all
the required services with desired quality in a determined time. In a further step a
framework agreement has to be negotiated which defines the service requirements,
the amount of services and the quality of service. In addition there are laid down
penalties for delivering service quality which does not match with the values in
the framework agreement. A typical framework agreement related to this case is
a service level agreement in terms of the Information Technology Infrastructure
Library (ITIL)7.
4.2.2. Policies. In contrast to the Intragrids, policies are more interesting and of
bigger importance in Intergrids. But the rules and regulations are more difficult
to implement and to enforce (see, e.g. [12, p. 49]).
Pratt and Zeckhauser hold, that ”whenever one individual depends on the
action of another, an agency relationship arises” [33, page 2]. The agent, which is
taking action for the principal, has usually an edge on information on the activity it
has to fulfill. If the principal is not able to monitor the agent’s actions on low costs,
the challenge arises. In Grid environments this situation occurs, if markets (in this
example Intergrid markets) are used to allocate resources. A service, which wants
to meet the requirement, has to buy the needed resources in a market. To ease this
situation Pratt and Zeckhauser [33] propose to construct a reciprocal relationship.
That means, for each pair of interacting participants a principal-agency relation
in the opposite direction has to be constructed. In other words, both participants
have to be principal and agent at the same time.
The first relation is easy to construct: the consumer (principal) requests a
service and the provider (agent) fulfills this guaranteed service. In figure 5 the price,
which has to be paid for the received service s, is denoted by pinter. The prices
are determined through the framework contract all participants have signed. This
contract defines the time period it is valid, the price for the service, the service’s
definition and a reputation threshold all service providers have to fulfill. The figure
also illustrates the different scopes the Grid agents have.
To meet the second principal-agent relation a reputation mechanism has to
be established: the principal of the first case is now the provider of a (potentially
good) reputation value and therefore fulfills the role of an agent. The service
provider, in the first case the agent, is now acting as principal, which pays with
quality of service and receives a reputation value, which is functionally dependent
7http://www.itil.org.uk/
Grid Policy Framework 15
Framework Agreement
Pj Pi
AiAj
pinter Repj
s QoSi
Provider
Scope
Consumer
Scope
Figure 5. Principal-agent relationship between service provider
and consumer in an Intergrid
on the quality of service. This reputation should be published for a huge amount
of participants to increase its significance.
A deduction for risk is not paid, because the prices are fixed through the
framework contract. In an economical view, this is an institution among all par-
ticipants of the Intergrid. Reputation values are managed through the institution
and used to exclude participants with an average reputation value under a cer-
tain threshold. This exclusion is technically realized through a central reputation
mechanism, which is authorised to exclude participants. Reputation mechanisms
are used to monitor the participants’ behavior. One possible reputation mechanism
is ReGreT, which has been proposed by Sabater and Sierra [35]. The effectiveness
of further reputation mechanisms in Grid environments is investigated in Sonnek
and Weissman [36].
In Intergrids and their business analogy, i.e. the virtual organisation, the
reputation institution is usually implemented through central mechanisms. That
conforms with the paraphrase above that a central unit is able to manage partners
joining and leaving the system.
4.2.3. Technology. Current implementations of the upcoming Grid standards like
the Web Service Resource Framework (WSRF)8 or the Open Grid Service Ar-
chitecture (OGSA)9 from the Global Grid Forum fulfill the requirements of our
Intergrid idea. All implementations, like gLite, Unicore or the Globus Toolkit pro-
vide functionalities to identify participants, basic security mechanisms etc. The
software can be used also between different organisational units, but needs central
registration points in the system.
8http://www.globus.org/wsrf/
9http://www.globus.org/ogsa/
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4.3. Open Grid
4.3.1. Business. Besides outsourcing with use of framework agreements a market
could also deliver the required services. The vision of an open grid market without a
central institution is challanging. An open grid market does not address particular
business models or services. It should rather be an independent platform for grid
resource or service trade.
In the late 1990’s the German telecom ”Deutsche Bundespost Telekom” was
privatized. New competitors joined the telecommunication market. To participate
in the market of telephony provider services a system of dial around service pre-
fixes for every provider was established. For instance a customer was able to choose
a particular telephony provider with specific characteristics (price, quality) on de-
mand without concluding a framework agreement. Since most of the providers were
unknown to the customers thus the price was the only differentiator. After a cer-
tain time differences in the quality of service became obvious. These quality-based
characteristics were not reflected by the price. This anomaly in digital service de-
livery have not been examined in the literature in detail, probably because of the
short existence. The dial around service offers have been displaced by framework
agreements (e.g. flat rates). Nowadays we are confronted with a very similar situ-
ation. Grid Computing resources like memory capacity or cpu cycles are offered as
a service. Without having a framework agreement there is no possibility to enforce
customers’ claims because providers and customers are often unknown to each
other. To compensate this lack of certainty the pre-selection of providers gains im-
portance. For this reason we follow a trust- and reputation based approach to make
rational pre-selection possible. Another possibility to deal with this uncertainty is
an insurance approach, which we do not follow in this paper.
4.3.2. Policies. Being an open system, the problem of different interests of par-
ticipants in the Grid economy increases. Not every single claim can be assigned
to a natural person. Constructing a reciprocal principal-agent relation is very im-
portant in open systems. We propose, as in Intergrids, to establish a reputation
mechanism in open Grid systems.
The missing framework contract leads to a deduction of risk ri for each service
contract. The consumer has to pay this deduction of risk less, but receives a risk
Riski in addition to the service (see figure 6). The deduction of risk is determined
through market behaviour. It is on behalf of a service provider to have a good
reputation in order to decrease this deduction of risk. Since the reputation is
functionally dependent on the provided quality of service (QoS), the QoS is finally
responsible for the deduction of risk of the following contracts. Hence, the service
provider should always fulfill the expected quality standards.
The service consumer, as counterpart, receives the service and the risk of an
uncertain execution (e.g. the service is not executed as the provider has promised
before). This risk can affect the execution time, the correctness of the outcome,
and so on. The consumer is not able to determine the risk before interaction takes
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Figure 6. Principal-agent relationship between service provider
and consumer in an open Grid
place. He can only estimate the risk through own experiences with the provider or
experiences, which can be requested from other system members.
As there is no central institution to manage reputation values, we propose
to implement a decentral mechanism. With the help of this decentral reputation
approach, the service consumer is able to optimize its outcome when choosing a
negotiation partner with help of its strategy. The service provider has to optimize
its strategy in providing a certain quality of service level as it is the base of the
reputation received after the interaction.
In contrast to the reputation mechanisms in Intergrids, the mechanisms in
open Grids are used to select services. In Intergrids, for each service provider in a
market it is important to have a reputation value above the institutional manager’s
threshold. Each service provider has to consider its reputation to minimize its
deduction of risk ri. Another difference regards excluding low rated participants.
Within an open system, there are no institutions for regulating and enforcing rules.
Hence the meaning of reputation in open Grids increases.
In this paper reputation is understood as circulation of an evaluation. The
evaluation’s source is unimportant, it might also be unknown. Together with an
image, which is a believed evaluation of a target, reputation leads to trust [37].
For instance, the Grid agents can lie while propagating reputation. As an effect,
agents receive bad reputation and get less profit through a higher deduction of risk.
Pinyol et al. [37] propose a cognitive approach to minimize the cheaters’ outcome.
One possible cognitive approach is Repage [38], which is enhanced in the eRep
project. Since this paper is not addressing reputation mechanism design, we refer
to the references mentioned above.
4.3.3. Technology. The technology development for example in SORMA has not
been finished yet. However, with the de facto standardization of resource descrip-
tions on a service basis (WS-Agreement) the technical prerequisites of trading
resources on markets have been made. In addition, the project tries to reconcile
the technological and policy sphere in the development of an economical sound
and technically feasible open Grid market that is extended by intelligent tools.
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Those tools are to be facilitating the bargaining and proving advantages for mar-
ket participants. Considering this ongoing process we refer to the SORMA web
page mentioned above.
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5. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper examined the role of reputation in grid environments. Our compre-
hension of grid environments incorporates the three basic perceptions technology,
business and policy. In addition, we depicted the mutual dependence of these
spheres. The success of an encoring business model does not only depend on the
underlying technology. The realization of a business concept crucially depends on
the institutional conditions. For an understanding of these rules, which form in-
stitutions, it is necessary to make an excursion in economical theory. Institutional
economics provide the instruments for enabling the illustration of reputation-based
mechanisms in grid environments as well as an explanation of different expansions
of grids. Our approach addresses the difference among the coordination forms of
grids. Namely the importance of the policy sphere depends on the coordination
form. The coordination form, in turn, determines which reputation mechanism
is necessary. In this paper, we introduced three policy concepts corresponding to
the different grid expansions. Recommendations can be derived, which form of
coordination fits best for each business model.
Finally further work should be done in refining the practical relevance of
our framework. Intermediate results of an empirical study we are carrying out,
briefly mentioned in section 4, do show the importance of reputation in particular
forms of Grid coordinations. Final results will show whether there is a necessity of
implementing reputation based mechanisms like our approach to facilitate trade of
resources in open Grid markets.10 Research is also required in refining our formal
derivation of risk and reputation. Therefore our model has to be evaluated which
is a future task of project eRep.
10These results are being published in the context of project SORMA
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ISSN
This paper examines the role of policies in 
different grid environments. As Grid technology 
becomes standardized and stable, various 
business models are invented and increasingly 
applied, and economic implications can be 
observed. Asymmetrically distributed information 
may allow for opportunistic behaviour of service 
providers or users who exploit the information 
gap between providers and consumers on the 
quality of services. This information gap 
determines the necessity of policies to keep the 
Grid system stable. Therefore this paper tackles 
economic issues by proposing a trust and 
reputation-based policy framework for enabling 
future open Grid markets, to recommend the 
most promising Grid architecture and a 
corresponding reputation approach in a 
particular case.
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